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JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DILEMMA: THE BASELINE
QUESTION
SUZANNA SHERRY*

Many commentators view City of Boerne v. Flores,' in which a
divided Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),2 as a major defeat in the battle for
religious freedom in the United States.' Be that as it may, Flores
is also an opportunity to begin a discussion on another issue
entirely: the appropriate relationship between dissenting Justices and majority opinions. Should a Justice who disagrees with a
majority of the Court nevertheless accept the majority's holding
as defining the law for purposes of establishing a baseline for
subsequent questions?
I. THE BASELINE DILEMMA
In order to understand the question I will address, some brief
background on Flores is necessary. Prior to 1990, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution-applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment-to require the government to accommodate religious
beliefs by granting exemptions to those with religious objections
to generally applicable laws, unless the government could show

* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University
of Minnesota. I would like to thank Jim Chen, Jack Cound, Paul Edelman, Dan
Farber, Phil Frickey, and Barry Friedman for helpful comments on earlier drafts,
and Betsey Buckheit, Minnesota J.D., 1999, for research assistance.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. A few, including myself, view it otherwise. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, RFRAVote Gambling: Why Paulsen is Wrong, As Usual, 14 CONST. COMIENTARY 27 (1997);
Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman, Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123; Daniel
0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The ConstitutionalSignificance of
an UnconstitutionalStatute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994); Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA
Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 65 (1996); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and
Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227 (1995); William P. Marshall, In Defense
of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
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a compelling interest. In 1990, in Employment Division v.
Smith,4 the Supreme Court abandoned this doctrine, concluding
that neutral, generally applicable laws--even if they burdened
religious practices-need only serve a legitimate state interest.
In 1993, Congress, relying on the power granted to it by Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Section 5"),5 enacted RFRA
by an overwhelming bipartisan vote.6 RFRA reinstated the compelling interest test for any state or federal statute that substantially burdened religious exercise. The question before the Court
in Flores was whether Congress's Section 5 powers were broad
enough to support RFRA. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
concluded that in attempting to protect rights beyond those
covered by the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Smith, Congress exceeded the powers granted to it by
the Constitution.
Justice O'Connor issued a passionate dissent in Flores, arguing that the Court should both uphold RFRA and overrule
Smith, the case that provoked the enactment of RFRA in the
first place. We are left in no doubt about Justice O'Connor's
views: she explicitly agreed with the majority that Congress's
Section 5 powers are limited, and indeed agreed that were
Smith the correct interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,
Congress would have no power to enact RFRA. Nevertheless, she
dissented from the invalidation of RFRA on the ground that
Smith was incorrectly decided-even though there are, at most,
only four votes for that proposition.'
This constellation of conclusions-that Smith deprives Congress of the power to enact RFRA but that Smith is
wrong-gives rise to a question that Justice O'Connor never
explicitly answered. She agreed that Congress is limited to im-

4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

5. Section 5 reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 5.
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-111 (1993).
7. Justices Souter and Breyer also dissented and called for reconsideration of
Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting), 2186 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the possibility that Justice Ginsburg might be willing
to overrule Smith, despite the fact that she joined the majority in Flores, see infra
pp. 890-91.
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plementing the rights actually contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment, as judicially defined. But should those rights be
defined by the Court as a whole or by each individual Justice?
To put it another way, Justice O'Connor's own view is that the
congressional interpretation of free exercise rights is the constitutionally correct one, even though a majority of the Court disagrees. As far as Justice O'Connor is concerned, then, is Congress bound by the latter view or may it rely on the former? In
one sense, this is asking whether the Court is a unitary entity,
which can speak with only one voice, or a collection of individual
Justices voting their individual consciences. If the Court is a
unitary entity, then perhaps there are times when an individual
Justice ought to vote against her own conscience. Whether, and
when, she ought to do so, is the subject of this Essay.
Notice that only a Justice who both agrees with Justice
Kennedy's narrow interpretation of Section 5 and disagrees with
Smith is entangled in this question. If Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Kennedy's view of Section 5, for example,
then she could easily dissent without raising the question of
whose interpretation of the Constitution counts: even if Smith is
correct, she might have written, Congress did not exceed its
Section 5 powers in enacting this prophylactic statute.8 It is only
because Justice O'Connor agreed that Congress's Section 5 powers are to be narrowly construed, cabined by the judicially determined meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, that she must face
the question at all.
The same question, which I will call the baseline question,
arises in a variety of circumstances. In its broadest formulation,

8. Justice Breyer might be thought to take this view. He joined Justice
O'Connors dissent to the extent that it questioned Smith, but rejected her endorsement of Justice Kennedy's discussion of Section 5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 2176,
2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Another possible approach for Justice O'Connor would have been to decide the
case directly on free exercise grounds rather than on statutory or Section 5 grounds.
She could have argued that RFRA was irrelevant, as the Free Exercise
Clause-correctly interpreted-mandated that the church be given the exemption it
desired. In that case, Justice O'Connor would simply have been dissenting, once
again, from the Court's determination of the issue raised in Smith.
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the question asks about the status of majority opinions of the
Supreme Court as positive law. Does a majority decision of the
Court constitute the law, even if it is incorrect? The Court clearly believes that its own determinations define the law as far as
all other governmental actors are concerned, from the president
to the lower federal courts to state officials. But to what extent
do existing majority determinations define the law for individual
Justices who dissented from, or now disagree with, the original
determinations? It may be, in Chief Justice Marshall's oft-repeated words, "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."9 But adherence to Justice Marshall's dogma-even in its strongest version-still does
not answer the question with which I am concerned in this Essay: who can authoritatively speak for the judicial department?
The baseline question arises whenever the Court has to determine what the law is or was in order to answer a further question. The paradigmatic baseline is a case in which the question
is whether some government body has disobeyed the Supreme
Court's instructions. The Court cannot determine whether the
instructions have been disobeyed without consulting the instructions themselves. The baseline question asks whether a Justice
who disagrees with those instructions should nevertheless judge
the actor against them. Variants of the baseline question arise
in other contexts as well. In order to decide whether a new statute works a retroactive effect, for example, the Court has to
establish what the law was at a prior point in time to set a
baseline against which to measure the challenged action. Or
when a majority of the Court determines that it has jurisdiction
in a particular case, dissenting Justices have to decide whether
to accept that determination and move on to the merits.
These situations sometimes require the Court, or individual
Justices, to determine whether majority pronouncements are
positive law and thus constitute the baseline from which to
proceed to further questions. Justices who dissented from the
original pronouncement are faced with a special dilemma: if they
disagree with how the Court defined the law, should they also

9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). For stronger variants of this sentiment, see cases discussed infra Part III.

1998]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DILEMMA

869

reject the Court's ruling as the baseline, implicitly denying it the
status of the law of the land? If there are five votes, then the
new majority can of course change existing law. But if the law

remains unchanged, is it still law as far as dissenting Justices
are concerned? No Justice has ever directly addressed this question, nor has it been explored in the scholarly literature.' 0

10. There has been scholarly discussion of two related topics. First, there has always been some controversy about the legitimacy of the Court's insistence that it is
the final arbiter of the Constitution. That dispute has been played out in law reviews; unsurprisingly, the Court itself has not doubted its own authority. For a representative sampling of the debate, see, for example, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 81-105 (1987); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On

Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen,
83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law:
Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387; Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretationof the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
359 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). The baseline question only arises if
one assumes-as the Court does-that Supreme Court decisions have some independent status as law and are therefore binding on at least some government actors.
Second, there is a burgeoning public choice literature addressing the question
whether judges on multimember panels, including the Supreme Court, should vote
by outcome or by issue. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager,
The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1993);
David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1996);
David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992); John M. Rogers, 'Issue Voting" by
Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L.
REv. 997 (1996); John M. Rogers, 'I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice As Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1991) [hereinafter Rogers, The
Supreme Court Justice as Epimendes]; Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others,
49 VAND. L. REV. 1045 (1996). My question is a slightly different one: in a case in
which the Justices do indicate their votes on individual issues, is it appropriate for
a Justice to take as a given a majority decision with which he or she disagrees? My
analysis, therefore, unlike that on the outcome-issue debate, is applicable not only to
single cases with multiple issues, but also to situations that arise as the result of a
series of cases. Conversely, my analysis is limited to cases in which the subissues
are dependent on one another; the classic case where issue-voting and outcome-voting produced different results, National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582 (1949), does not raise the baseline question at all.
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Notice that the baseline dilemma can be distinguished from
another question to which it bears a superficial resemblance.
Asking whether a dissenting Justice should accept the majority
pronouncement as the law is not the same as determining
whether a prior decision ought to be accorded the respect demanded by the doctrine of stare decisis. The stare decisis question asks whether the Court as a whole should overrule its prior
decision; majority and dissenting Justices often disagree on that
issue. Once a majority decides not to overrule, however, what
should a dissenting Justice do in the next case?
If the next case raises essentially the same question, then
there is no baseline dilemma. The dissenting Justice can either
concede the point or reargue the issue. Justices thus may occasionally continue to reject a particular holding of the Supreme
Court from which they dissented, dissenting again and again in
every case raising the same question or issue. Justices Brennan
and Marshall took this approach in death penalty cases, for
example, reiterating in every case their view-repeatedly rejected by the majority-that the death penalty was always unconstitutional."
Repeated dissents on the same question, however, do not
usually raise the baseline dilemma. Repeated dissents raise only
the question of whether the original decision was correct, not the
question of whether the original and presumably incorrect majority pronouncement should nevertheless be treated as establishing the legal baseline. It is only when the answer in the
second case depends on the Court having already answered the
initial question that the baseline dilemma arises. In repeated
dissents, for example, no action is being judged by whether it
conforms to the law as previously pronounced by the Supreme
Court. Either the action is legal or it is not, and no prior Supreme Court decision is relevant to that determination except as
a matter of stare decisis. In the baseline situation, by contrast,
the outcome actually depends on whether the earlier pronouncement-right or wrong-should be taken as establishing the governing law. Repeated dissents continue to raise the same ques-

11. See, e.g., Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 726 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227-28 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion, perhaps with slightly different frills. Baseline cases, however, raise entirely new questions, but ones that cannot be resolved without first consulting the law previously announced by
the Court.
Justice O'Connor in Flores-without discussing the issue-declined to use Smith as a baseline, instead judging
Congress's Section 5 power against her own, dissenting, view of
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. It is easy to applaud
Justice O'Connor's approach: after all, Section 5 gives Congress
the power to enforce the FourteenthAmendment, and if Justice
O'Connor believes that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
right to religious exemptions, then she should vote to uphold a
statute that enforces that right. Nevertheless, I think that an
easy acceptance of Justice O'Connor's approach masks difficult
questions about the extent to which dissenting Justices might
have an obligation to accept the rulings of a majority of their
colleagues as defining the law--especially given such cases as
Cooper v. Aaron. 2 Had she felt such an obligation, Justice
O'Connor might have instead concluded that Section 5 gives
Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as
interpreted by a majority of the Supreme Court.
In this Essay, I will make three arguments in support of the
baseline approach. In Part H, I will demonstrate that in a variety of contexts, various Justices have assumed that majority
decisions do define the law-even when the Justices in question
disagree with the majority's holding. Indeed, in at least one
other case, Justice O'Connorhas been content to let a majority
opinion with which she disagrees establish a baseline to define
the boundaries of congressional power. 3 In Part III, I will examine the numerous cases, including some authored by Justice
O'Connor, in which the Court has used language strongly suggestive of the view that it is the decisions of the Supreme Court
as a single unit that determine the law. Finally, in Part IV, I

12. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). See "generally Farber, supra note 10 (discussing the
"rule of law' and the Supreme Court in the context of Cooper v. Aaron).
13. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.

872

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

will argue that in many-if not most-situations, it is appropriate for dissenting Justices to consider the views of a majority as
the baseline for subsequent analysis.
II. ACCEPTING MAJORITY DEcISIoNs AS THE BASELINE
Justices most often confront the baseline question when deciding issues of retroactivity. In order to examine whether a new
statute has a retroactive effect, the Court must always first
determine what the law was at some past time. For purposes of
this Essay, we can ask whether, in determining what the law
was at some prior date, a Justice should consult her own views
or those of the Court. In most cases, a Justice will look to the
views of the majority for this baseline--even when that Justice
dissented in the original case.
A series of events surrounding the correct interpretation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 provides an example. Section 1981 prohibits race
discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts. In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,14 the Supreme Court interpreted § 1981 very narrowly. The Court in Patterson held that §
1981 "does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation
of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations." 5 The Court thus held
that § 1981 did not reach racially motivated harassment, racially
motivated discharge, or other racially discriminatory treatment
on the job. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
dissented from that narrow interpretation of § 1981."
In 1991, Congress overruled Patterson by enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act").' The 1991 Act expanded
the scope of § 1981 by defining it to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship." 8 After 1991, then, § 1981 reached

14. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).

15. Id. at 171.
16. See id&at 189 (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
219 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
18. Id.
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discriminatory discharges.
Inevitably, the Court was faced with the question of whether
the 1991 Act should apply to cases arising prior to its enactment. The case raising this question arose in 1986, when
Maurice Rivers and Robert Davison brought a § 1981 suit alleging that they had been discharged because of their race. At that
time-prior to Patterson-mostlower courts interpreted § 1981
to prohibit racially motivated discharges.' 9 But before the case
went to trial, the Supreme Court decided Patterson, and the
district court accordingly dismissed the § 1981 suit. While the
case was pending on appeal, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 took
effect. Rivers and Davison thus argued that the 1991 Act should
govern their case.
In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,"0 the Supreme Court held
that Congress did not intend to give retroactive effect to the
1991 statute, and, therefore, that the case was governed by
Patterson,not by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that because the 1991 Act merely
restored the law to the understanding that prevailed before
Patterson,it would not be unfair to their employer to apply the
rule "that the parties believed to be the law when they acted."2 '
Justice Stevens, who dissented in Patterson,wrote the majority
opinion in Rivers, using Pattersonas the baseline against which
to measure subsequent congressional action.
Justice Stevens's opinion made very clear that the baseline
meaning of a law is defined by the Court, not by individual
Justices:
It is this Courtes responsibility to say what a statute means,
and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts
19. See, e.g., Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir.
1988); Demery v. City of Youngstown, 818 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir. 1987); Irby v.
Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1984); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688
F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982). The principal Supreme Court § 1981 case prior to Patterson
is Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which took a broad approach to § 1981
although it did not rule on the Patterson question.
20. 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
21. Id. at 309.
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to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law. A
judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the
decision of the case giving rise to that construction. Thus,
Patterson provides the authoritative interpretation of the
phrase "make and enforce contracts" in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 [§ 1981] before the 1991 amendment went into effect
on November 21, 1991. That interpretation provides the baseline for our conclusion that that 1991 amendment would be
"retroactive" if applied to cases arising before that date.'

The fact that Justice Stevens himself thought Patterson an incorrect interpretation of § 1981 and that the 1991 Act simply
corrected that mistake, was irrelevant. Once the Court had spoken, the baseline was established-until and unless Patterson

was overruled. The district court therefore correctly applied
Pattersonto a pending lawsuit, and the court of appeals correctly viewed any subsequent legislative change as inapplicable to
the suit. The only remaining question was whether Congress
intended the new statute to have retroactive effect. Justice
Stevens's majority opinion concluded that it did not.
A slightly more convoluted version of the retroactivity baseline question was raised in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.' The
genesis of Plaut lies in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &

Petigrow v. Gilbertson,' in which the Court unexpectedly inter22. Id. at 312-13. Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Patterson, also dissented
in Rivers. See id. at 314-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He did not rely on the incorrectness of Patterson, however, but rather on his view that Congress intended to
give the statute retroactive effect. See id. at 317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

23. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
24. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). Lampf may be viewed as raising the baseline problem
for Justice Scalia, and he took his usual unique approach. His view on the statute
of limitations question before the Court in Lampf was that if Congress does not
specify a statute of limitations, then there should be no time limitation on suits at
all. See id. at 364 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
He also noted, however, that had he been presented with it as a question of first
impression, he would not have even created the implied cause of action that was the
subject of the statute of limitations dispute in Lampf. See id. at 365 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He claimed to be willing to accept
the earlier majority decision creating the cause of action, as a matter of stare decisis, but he reasoned that to apply his "no limitations period at all" analysis to it
would create 'unintended and possibly irrational results." Id. at 365 (Scalia, J., con-
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preted provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"1934 Act") to provide for a very short statute of limitations.
Justice O'Connor dissented from this holding, along with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor was particularly unhappy about applying the new statute of limitations to
bar the plaintiffs' suit in Lampf itself, preferring to apply the
new rule only prospectively.'
In December, 1991, six months after Lampf, Congress passed
a law amending the 1934 Act to provide for a longer statute of
limitations.26 The new law, in section 27A(b), also provided that
any case that had been dismissed under Lampf but which fell
within the new longer statute of limitations could be "reinstated
on motion by the plaintiff" if such motion was made within sixty
days of enactment of the new law.' In Plaut,the Supreme Court
invalidated section 27A(b).
Plaut involved a securities fraud case that was pending in
federal district court at the time of the Lampf decision. After
Lampf, the district court dismissed the case as time-barred. The
dismissal was warranted under the Supreme Court's decision in
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia," which held that new

curring in part and concurring in the judgment). He thus concurred in the Courtes
decision to borrow a statute of limitations from another provision of the Securities
Exchange Act and to dismiss the suit as time barred. See id. at 364-66 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As in American Trucking Ass'ns
v. Smith, discussed infra at notes 32-35 and accompanying text, Justice Scalia superficially adhered to the majority decision, but then voted against the result toward
which this adherence directed him.
25. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 369, 370 (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
I write separately only to express my disagreement with the Court's decision in Part IV to apply the new limitations period in this case. In holding that respondents' suit is time barred under a limitations period that
did not exist before today, the Court departs drastically from our established practice and inflicts an injustice on the respondents ... . Quite
simply, the Court shuts the courthouse door on respondents because they
were unable to predict the future.
26. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994).
27. Id. § 78aa-l(b).
28. 501 U.S. 529 (1991); see also Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86, 94-99 (1993) (recognizing the rule adopted by a majority of Justices in Beam, al-
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Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes must be applied to pending cases. The plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal, and the judgment accordingly became final thirty days later.
When section 27A(b) was enacted, plaintiffs moved to reopen the
case. The district court found that reinstatement would be required under section 27A(b), but denied plaintiffs' motion on the
ground that section 27A(b) was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Plaut reasoned that in
allowing final judgments to be reopened, Congress had violated
separation-of-powers principles by depriving the judiciary of its
authority to make final decisions in individual cases. This holding necessarily depends on Lampf as a valid statement of the
law until the enactment of section 27A(b). If Lampfs interpretation of the 1934 Act, which turned out to be incorrect, was for
that reason not the law, then the district court acted lawlessly: it
never should have dismissed the Plauts' action. Congress was
only restoring all parties to the situations in which they would
have been absent Lampf-something it was presumably entitled
to do in the face of a lawless judicial act. All section 27A(b) did,
then, was deny Lampf any residual retroactive effect.
So what should a Justice who thinks Lampf was wrongly
decided do? The Lampf dissenters chose different paths: Justice
O'Connor, along with Justices Souter and Kennedy, joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Plaut. Justice Stevens, on the
other hand, dissented.29 None of these Justices addressed the
baseline question. Nonetheless, we can surmise that those who
joined the majority opinion accepted Lampf as the baseline
against which to judge subsequent congressional action, despite
the fact that they individually disagreed with Lampf. Indeed,
the language of Justice Scalia's opinion strongly implies that the
Supreme Court-as a unit-is the one and only final spokesman
for the U.S. judiciary: Article III, Justice Scalia wrote, creates
"not a batch of unconnected courts, but a judicial department
though in separate opinions).
29. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens's dissent, which took issue with the majority's separation-of-powers analysis, gave no clue as to whether he might also have been influenced by his disagreement with Lampf.
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composed of 'inferior Courts' and 'one supreme Court." 0 Plaut
thus provides an example of a case in which Justice O'Connor
took an approach exactly opposite the one she took in Flores,
and joined an opinion suggesting that the baseline is always the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court. It is a particularly telling example, moreover, because section 27A(b) was designed to
rectify the very aspect of Lampf that most troubled her-its
retroactive application.
Not every Justice chooses to defer to earlier majority rulings
in cases raising retroactivity questions. In one recent case, Justice Scalia explicitly took an approach mirroring Justice
O'Connor's in Flores. In 1987, in American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Scheiner,3 ' the Court invalidated certain types of highway taxes
on dormant commerce clause grounds. Justice Scalia dissented.
Three years later, in a case confusingly styled American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 2 the Court held that Scheiner did not apply
retroactively to taxes imposed prior to 1987. Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion reached this conclusion by applying a threefactor test for retroactivity.33
Justice Scalia, however, refused to join the majority opinion in
American TruckingAss'ns v. Smith, although he concurred in the
result. He rejected the majority's retroactivity test, reiterating his
view that all Supreme Court constitutional decisions should have
full retroactive effects because the Court is announcing the meaning of the Constitution, which does not change. He nevertheless
refused to give retroactive effect to Scheiner:
I do not think that a sensible understanding of [stare decisis]
requires me to vote contrary to my view of the law where such a

30. Id. at 227. Justice Scalia made the quoted statement in the course of explaining why Congress may alter a judgment still pending on appeal, but not a
judgment from which all appeals have been foregone or completed.
31. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
32. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
33. See id. at 179-83.
34. Except when the Court announces a new rule of criminal procedure favoring
criminal defendants. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989); Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 350-51 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
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vote would not only impose upon a litigant liability I think to be
wrong, but would also upset that litigant'ssettled expectations
because the earlier decision for which stare decisis effect is
claimed... overruled prior law.... I think it appropriate, in
other words-indeed, I think it necessary-for a judge whose
view of the law causes him to dissent from an overruling to
persist in that position (at least where his vote is necessary to
the disposition of the case) with respect to action taken before
the overruling occurred."5
In American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, Justice Scalia conceded
that his views on retroactivity, when combined with Scheiner,
yielded one result; but because of his disagreement with
Scheiner, he voted for the opposite result. Justice O'Connor did
the same thing in Flores: her views on Section 5 powers, when
combined with (the other) Smith, would result in invalidating
RFRA; but because of her disagreement with Smith, she voted to
uphold RFRA. In Rivers and Plaut, however, the Justices who
dissented in earlier cases took the opposite approach: they applied their general views on retroactivity and congressional
powers to extend the applicability of existing precedent, even
though they disagreed with the precedent.
It is arguable whether Justice Scalia was correct when he
refused to take as the starting point for his retroactivity analysis
the Court's decision in Scheiner. A series of cases from the
1950s, however, illustrates the absurd results that can occur if
dissenting Justices routinely refuse to accept majority holdings
as a baseline.3 6 In 1944, Congress suspended the statute of limitations for prosecution for defrauding the government. The

35. American Trucking Ass'ns, 496 U.S. at 205. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, which applied the three-factor
retroactivity test. When, four years later, a majority of the Court adopted Justice
Scalia's position that new decisions should always be retroactively applied, Justice
O'Connor dissented. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99
(1993); id. at 113 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For an extended discussion of Justice
Scalia's role in this series of cases, see Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of
the Judicial Power, 59 MO. L. REV. 281, 302-06 (1994).
36. I am indebted to Jack Cound for bringing these cases to my attention.
37. See Contract Settlement Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-395, § 19, 58 Stat. 649,
667-68 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1994)).
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purpose of the suspension was to give the government time, in
the midst of wartime contracts and other activity, to ferret out
defrauders. But the statute Congress enacted was ambiguous: it
stated that "[tihe running of any existing statute of limitations
[in fraud cases] ... shall be suspended until three years after
the termination of hostilities in the present war." " The war
was officially declared terminated on December 31, 1946. 3' The
ambiguity in the statute left open an important question, ultimately to be resolved by the Supreme Court: Did the ordinary
three-year limitations period begin running again on January 1,
1947, or three years later on January 1, 1950?
The first case the Supreme Court decided involved crimes
committed in 1947, after the war. In United States v. Smith,4° a
majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the ordinary
three-year limitations period began to run again on January 1,
1947. The Court thus dismissed an indictment brought more
than three years after the commission of the crime.4 ' Four Justices dissented: Justices Minton, Reed, Jackson, and Burton
reasoned that the entire statute of limitations was suspended
until January 1, 1950, when it began to run again. The dissenters therefore would have upheld the indictment because it was
brought within three years of that date. The dissent, and four
Justices in the majority, apparently assumed-although they did
not address the question explicitly-that crimes committed during and after the suspension period should each be subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. They disagreed only on the
appropriate starting date for the running of the statute of limitations. Justice Clark, however, joined the majority but wrote a
separate concurrence in which he argued that the effect of the
statute was to treat wartime offenses differently from post-war
offenses. For wartime offenses, he would have agreed with the
dissent and started the limitations period in 1950, giving the

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 19(b).
See 3 C.F.R. 99, 100 (1943-48), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. at 289 (1994).
342 U.S. 225 (1952).
See id. at 226, 229-30.
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government "six years from the [proclamation ending the war] to
investigate and prosecute."42 But because United States v.
Smith involved a post-war fraud, Justice Clark concluded the
suspension act did not apply and the statute of limitations period was the ordinary three years. He was the only Justice to take
this position.
Eighteen months later, the Court faced two cases raising the
question of the appropriate limitations period for a wartime
offense. In United States v. Klinger," the Second Circuit unanimously dismissed a conviction brought more than three years
after the end of the war. In Klinger, Judge Hand concluded that
all the Justices except Justice Clark would dismiss the indictment. He reasoned that the minority Justices would take as a
baseline the holding of the majority that the ordinary statute of
limitations began to run again in 1947:
Forced, as by hypothesis we are to assume that [the dissenters in United States v. Smith] would feel themselves to be, to
hold that there was a statute of limitations before January
1st, 1950, at least as to some crimes; and that as to these it
did not begin 'to run again' on that day, we have no warrant
for supposing that they would hold that, crimes committed
before January 1st, 1947, might be prosecuted at any time
before January 1st, 1953, although those committed between
January 1st, 1947 and January 1st, 1950, must be prosecuted
before that date."
When Klinger reached the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson did
not participate. Justice Clark, following his earlier reasoning,
presumably took the position that the suspension act meant
exactly what Hand said it could not mean. But instead of Hand's
expected seven to one affirmance, the Court affirmed by an
equally divided vote. Each of the seven remaining Justices had
apparently adhered to the position he had taken in Smith.

42. Id. at 231 (Clark, J., concurring).
43. 199 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1952), affd by an equally divided Court, 345 U.S. 979
(1953).
44. Id. at 647.
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One final development occurred. In United States v.
45 the other wartime offense case (handed down the
Grainger,
same day as Klinger), Chief Justice Vinson switched sides, leaving only three Justices who thought that the time for prosecution had expired three years after the end of the war. Five Justices-the Chief Justice, Justice Clark, and the three Smith
dissenters besides the absent Jackson-held that an indictment
for a wartime offense could be brought at any time until January 1, 1953. Note that Chief Justice Vinson's change of heart
made the difference only because Justice Jackson did not participate in either case. Had Justice Jackson participated and joined
his fellow Smith dissenters, the Court in Klinger would have
reversed Judge Hand by a vote of five to four; Graingerwould
have simply followed as a matter of course.46
Despite the fact that eight Justices-all but Justice
Clark-believed that wartime and postwar offenses should be
subject to identical limitations periods, they were not. Offenses
committed during the war could be prosecuted for six years after
the end of the war, while offenses committed after the war could
only be prosecuted for three years after they were committed.
With no effective changes in personnel or in views, Justice
Clark's solo opinion in Smith became the law. This occurred
because the dissenters refused to take the baseline approach. If
adherence to a prior dissent sometimes leads to the absurd result of treating differently two cases that eight Justices believe
should 47
be treated alike, then sometimes such adherence must be
wrong.

45. 346 U.S. 235 (1953).
46. Similarly, if we were to ignore both Justice Jackson and Chief Justice Vinson-depriving each side in Smith of one vote-the result in Grainger would have
been the same by a vote of four to three.
47. One might argue that County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989),
raised a similar problem. In County of Allegheny, the Court confronted an Establishment Clause challenge to two displays: a creche and a menorah. See id. at 578.
Four Justices concluded that both displays were constitutional. See id at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Three Justices
concluded that both displays were unconstitutional. See id. at 637, 654-55 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). All seven agreed that the two should
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An analogous-although not identical-baseline question can
arise within a single decision. When the Court must answer a
series of questions in sequence in order to dispose of a case,
what is the appropriate response of a Justice who disagrees with
the majority's answer to an early question in the series? Should
she stop there, affirming or reversing the lower court merely on
the basis of this partial answer, or should the Justice instead
abide by the majority's answer and address subsequent questions? In four different cases, eight different Justices have suggested that it is appropriate to take the majority's determination
as a baseline."
The simplest example is Justice White's approach in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 49 Union Gas raised two questions: (1)
whether Congress, in enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) or the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), had intended to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and thus to subject states to suits for damages in
federal court; and (2) whether Congress was constitutionally
permitted to do so. The second question does not arise unless
the first question is answered affirmatively."0 The court of ap-

be treated alike. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor concluded, however, that the two
were distinguishable and that only the menorah display was constitutional. See id.
at 613-21 (Blackmun, J.), 632-37 (O'Connor, J.). Despite the fact that seven Justices
would have treated the creche and menorah together, then, one stood and one fell.
The problem with treating County of Allegheny as a baseline question, however, is
that it is difficult to know which view should be considered the baseline. The conclusion of the four-not a majority-that neither display raised constitutional problems?
The conclusion of the seven-on a question not explicitly raised or considered as a
separate issue-that the two should be treated alike? Even if they had agreed to accept the latter, how should Justices Blackmun and O'Connor have voted? County of
Allegheny suggests that voting by issue rather than by outcome might sometimes be
appropriate, but it does not tell us much about the baseline problem.
48. Some of these cases also implicate the debate over voting by outcome or by
issue and are discussed extensively in that literature. See supra note 10.
49. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66
(1996).
50. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
474-76 (1987) (finding no explicit intent to abrogate and therefore not deciding the
constitutional question); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-46
(1985) (same). It is, of course, logically possible to reverse the order of the questions:
If the Constitution would not permit Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
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peals answered both questions affirmatively, allowing the lawsuit to proceed.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice White
concluded that Congress had not, in fact, intended to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in enacting CERCLA or SARA. Justice White's dilemma arose because five of his brethren disagreed, concluding that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, contained a sufficiently explicit abrogation of immunity. But only
four of the Justices who found that CERCLA abrogated immunity went on to conclude that Congress was constitutionally
empowered to do so; Justice Scalia, after deciding that
CERCLA abrogated immunity, would have invalidated that
part of CERCLA as unconstitutional.5
Justice White was therefore faced with the baseline dilemma.
Should he simply cast the fifth vote to reverse the lower court,
on the ground that CERCLA did not authorize the suit-thus
joining Justice Scalia and three Justices who thought that the
abrogation was both outside the statute and unconstitutional--or should he take as settled the majority ruling that
CERCLA did authorize the suit and then decide whether
CERCLA was constitutional? He chose the latter course:
My view on the statutory issue has not prevailed, however;
a majority of the Court has ruled that the statute, as amended, plainly intended to abrogate the immunity of the States
from suit in the federal courts. I accept that judgment. This
brings me to the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to abrogate the States' immunity. 52

the Court need not address whether Congress has nevertheless futilely tried to do
so. To order the questions that way, however, would conflict with the Court's general practice of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
51. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 35-42 (dissenting opinion). Justice Scalia's view
ultimately prevailed seven years later in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
52. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 56-57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
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Justice White concluded that Congress did have the constitutional power, thus providing the crucial fifth vote for affirming the
lower court and allowing the lawsuit to proceed.53
In an essentially identical single baseline case almost two
decades before Union Gas, Justices Harlan and Blackmun chose
the same course. In United States v. Vuitch,M the Court reviewed a district court decision invalidating a District of Columbia antiabortion law. The case raised novel and serious jurisdictional questions, and only five Justices concluded that the
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal of the United
States. Justices Harlan and Blackmun were among the dissenters from that conclusion. They would have dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, letting stand the lower court's invalidation of the statute.55 They nevertheless deferred to the majority's
finding of proper jurisdiction and went on to vote to reverse the
district court and to uphold the statute. Justice Blackmun briefly explained his decision to reach the merits: "Because of the inability of the jurisdictional-issue majority to agree upon the
disposition of the case, I feel obligated not to remain silent as to
the merits."" Justice Harlan reached the merits "substantially
for the reasons set forth in MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S separate
opinion."57 Like Justice White, their perceived obligations to the
deliberative body overcame their individual disagreement with
53. See id at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). One commentator has
derided Justice White's approach as "madness" and "slightly ludicrous." Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 7, 11 n.12
(1997). Another called it "[plossibly the most unsettling phenomenon" of that term.
Rogers, The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenidis, supra note 10, at 439. One point
of my Essay, of course, is to suggest that Justice White's position is not only defensible, but has been taken by numerous Justices at various times.
54. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
55. See id. at 81-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction). The jurisdictional
statute allowed direct appeals to the Supreme Court in all cases in which an indictment was dismissed because of the unconstitutionality of the statute. See id. at 66.
The Court divided over whether the term "statute" included laws governing only the
District of Columbia, which, in the days before home rule, were passed by Congress.
See id. at 64-66; id. at 81-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction).
56. Id. at 98 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who also found that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
chose the opposite course, and did not reach the merits. See id. at 81 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting as to jurisdiction).
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the result reached by a majority. Moreover, Vuitch may be considered an especially important example of the baseline approach, because Justices Harlan's and Blackmun's dissenting
view of jurisdiction not only would have warranted a different
disposition of the case, it would have deprived them of any authority to reach the merits.
A slightly more complex example of the single-case baseline
question is presented by Arizona v. Fulminante.8 Oreste
Fulminante challenged his conviction for murder on the ground
that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence a coerced
confession. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed, reversing his
conviction. A badly fractured U.S. Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Arizona Supreme Court. The case, as presented to
the U.S. Supreme Court, raised three questions: (1) Was
Fulminante's confession coerced? (2) Are coerced confessions
subject to harmless error analysis, so that a conviction in such a
case might sometimes stand despite the erroneous admission of
the confession? and (3) Was the admission of Fulminante's coerced confession actually harmless? Again, as in Union Gas and
Vuitch, each of the first two questions must be answered affirmatively in order for the subsequent question(s) to be raised.59
Three different majorities answered each of the first two questions affirmatively and the last question negatively, with the
result that the conviction was invalidated on the ground that
admitting Fulminante's coerced confession was not harmless
error. No Justice was in the majority on all three questions.
Because of the shifting majorities, Justice Kennedy was faced
with the baseline question.
Justice White, writing for himself and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, found the confession to be coerced. The other four Justices dissented from that holding. Only

58. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
59. It is possible to treat the questions in a slightly different order, asking first
whether the confession was coerced, then whether the error was harmless, and
reaching the appropriateness of the harmless error analysis to coerced confessions
only if the error is first found to be harmless. That ordering, however, still requires
an affirmative answer to each question before proceeding to the next one.
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four of the Justices in this majority, however, also concluded
that the determination of coercion should end the case. Justice
Scalia joined the four dissenters to create a majority holding
that the admission of a coerced confession need not invalidate
the conviction if the error was harmless.
In reaching the second question-whether harmless error
analysis applies to coerced confessions-despite their negative
answer to the question of whether Fulminante's confession was
coerced, the Justices who dissented from the finding of coercion
were not really faced with a baseline question. To see why,
imagine that Justice Scalia had joined all of Justice White's
opinion, leaving the same four dissenters on every question.
Certainly, in that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion could quite legitimately have reached all three questions
as alternative grounds pointing in the same direction: the confession was not coerced, and even if it had been, the error was
harmless. The Chief Justice therefore need not care whether a
majority disagreed with his finding of voluntariness; the harmless error analysis simply provided an alternative reason to uphold the conviction despite the majority's ruling.
Similarly, the fact that Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens thought that no coerced confession could ever constitute harmless error should not stop them from analyzing
whether the admission of this coerced confession was harmless,
once a majority has concluded that the harmless error rule is applicable. Again, had they been in dissent throughout, they could
have argued that the harmless error rule did not apply and that
even if it did, admitting the confession was not harmless.
But Justice Kennedy was faced with the baseline question,
and he answered it the same way that Justice White did in
Union Gas and Justices Harlan and Blackmun did in Vuitch.
Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist on the
first two questions: he found the confession voluntary, and he
thought that even coerced confessions should be subject to harmless error analysis. He nevertheless joined the four Justices with
whom he had disagreed on both questions and cast the fifth vote
to invalidate the conviction on the ground that "admission of the
confession could not be harmless error when viewed in light of
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all the other evidence."" He thus reversed the conviction because, although he thought the confession was properly admitted, he agreed that if the confession had been improperly admitted the error could not be considered harmless.
Justice Kennedy cast his vote with a clear acknowledgement
that he was necessarily accepting as a baseline a conclusion
with which he disagreed, simply because five Justices had
reached it. His explanation is worth quoting at length:
For the reasons stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I agree
that Fulminante's confession ...

was not coerced. In my

view, the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony.
A majority of the Court, however, finds the confession coerced and proceeds to consider whether harmless-error analysis may be used when a coerced confession has been admitted at trial. With the case in this posture, it is appropriate for me to address the harmless-error issue.
Again for the reasons stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I
agree that harmless-error analysis should apply in the case
of a coerced confession. That said, the court conducting a
harmless error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact
a full confession may have on the trier of fact ...

If the

jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it
doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the
crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant's plea of innocence. For the
reasons given by JUSTICE WHITE... I cannot with confidence find admission of Fulminante's confession.., to be
harmless error.
The same majority of the Court does not agree on the three
issues presented by the trial court's determination to admit
Fulminante's first confession .... My own view that the confession was not coerced does not command a majority.
In the interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court in this capital case, I deem it proper to

60. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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accept in the case now before us the holding of five Justices
that the confession was coerced and inadmissible.6
Like Justices White, Harlan, and Blackmun-and unlike Justice
O'Connor in Flores-Justice Kennedy believed that he was
obliged to accept the Court's decision as a baseline against
which to consider the remaining questions.'
In all three of these cases, the Justices in question faced an
especially difficult decision. Each Justice provided the dispositive
vote against an ultimate outcome that he favored. Justice White
in Union Gas, for example, believed that the Court should have
dismissed the suit on statutory grounds, and it was only his decision to waive the statutory point and to address the constitutional
issue anyway that resulted in affirming the lower court and allowing the suit to go forward. If Justices Harlan and Blackmun
had prevailed on the jurisdictional issue in Vuitch, then the Court
would have dismissed the appeal, leaving intact the lower court's
invalidation of the statute. They nevertheless provided the two
necessary votes to reverse the lower court and uphold the statute,
in a case in which they believed they lacked jurisdiction. Similarly, if Justice Kennedy had adhered to his position that the confession was not coerced, then the Court would have reinstated the
conviction; if admitting the confession was not even constitutional
error,then it was certainly harmless.
In at least two other cases, four different Justices took the
baseline approach, but it did not affect the ultimate outcome of
the litigation. In United States v. Jorn,"s the lower court dismissed an indictment on double jeopardy grounds. When the
case reached the Supreme Court, Justices Black and Brennan
dissented from the Court's decision that it had jurisdiction. They
nevertheless joined four other Justices to provide a majority for

61. Id. at 313-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
62. As Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager have pointed out, there may be
some circumstances in which judges may have to act as White, Harlan, Blackmun,
and Kennedy did in order for the court to issue a ruling at all. See Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 113-14
(1986); Rogers, The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenidis, supra note 10, at 459-61.
Neither Union Gas, Vuitch, nor Fulminante involved such circumstances.
63. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
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affirming the lower court's dismissal on the merits: "MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN believe that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.... However, in view of a
decision by a majority of the Court to reach the merits, they join
the judgment of the Court.' Their choice did not alter the ultimate outcome of the case: a refusal to join the majority in reaching the merits would still have left the lower court decision
standing, with four Justices voting to affirm the appeal and two
to dismiss it. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between an affirmance and a dismissal of an appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,' only six
of the eight participating Justices thought that the Court had
jurisdiction over the case. Only four of the six voted to affirm the
lower court and uphold the challenged statute, which denied
driving privileges to certain debtors. Justice Stewart thought
there was no jurisdiction, but provided the fifth vote to affrm:
"The Court, however, holds that this appeal is properly here,
and on the merits of the litigation I agree with the Court's conclusion."6 6 Chief Justice Warren similarly reached the merits
despite his view that the Court lacked jurisdiction; he would
have invalidated a portion of the statute while upholding much
of it. In Justice Stewart's case, as with Justices Black and
Brennan in Jorn, his vote to affirm on the merits had the same
ultimate effect as a vote to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the Chief Justice's case, his vote on the merits to
reverse in part would have yielded a different outcome than his
vote to dismiss the appeal-but because only two other Justices
supported reversal, the Chief Justice's vote did not have any
actual effect.
These two cases are less important than Union Gas, Vuitch,
and Fulminante, because the Justices who accepted a majority
determination with which they disagreed did not have to provide

64. Id. at 488 (Black and Brennan, JJ., concurring in judgment).

65. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
66. Id. at 174 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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the crucial vote against their preferred outcome. Nevertheless,
their willingness to accede to the majority rather than insisting
on their own reasons for affirmance or reversal demonstrates a
similar commitment to treating a majority decision as a
baseline."
One final case may-or may not-provide a counter-example
to Justice O'Connor's approach. The perfect contrast to Justice
O'Connor would be a Justice who agreed with her that Smith
was wrong and that Congress's Section 5 powers are severely
limited, but who nevertheless chose to accept Smith as the
baseline and to strike down RFRA. Justice Ginsburg may be
that Justice. But there's a catch: although we know-because
she joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Flores-that
Justice Ginsburg agrees with Justice O'Connor on the question
of Congress's Section 5 powers, she has never commented on
Smith. An opinion she wrote in 1984, while still on the court of
appeals, however, might provide some evidence that she disagrees with Smith.
In 1984, long before Smith, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit decided a religious freedom case that would
eventually reach the Supreme Court. The court of appeals held

67. Justice Blackmun cited these two cases, as well as two others, in his opinion
in Vuitch. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 98 (1971). One commentator
dismisses as distinguishable all four of the cases relied on by Justice Blackmun. See
Rogers, The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenidis, supra note 10, at 462-63. Rogers
suggested that Jorn was "a decision on alternate grounds." Id. at 462 & n.76. The
statement by Justices Black and Brennan, however, asserts that they concur specifically "in view of a decision by a majority of the Court to reach the merits." Jorn,
400 U.S. at 488. (Except for a half-sentence description of their reason for finding no
jurisdiction, I have quoted their statement in its entirety, supra in text accompanying note 64.). That formulation strongly implies that they did something other than
simply reach the same conclusion on alternate grounds. Rogers distinguished Kesler
because the Justices' votes were "unclear and made no difference in the outcome."
Rogers, The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenidis, supra note 10, at 463 & n.77.
The Justices in Kesler were very clear about their views on jurisdiction and their
views on the merits; I do not understand Rogers's characterization. The idea that
their votes made no difference to the outcome, which is true of Jorn as well, only
means that their votes did not require the same amount of principled integrity as
did the votes in Union Gas, Vuitch, and Fulminante; it does not change the fact
these four Justices recognized the baseline problem and made a choice different from
the one Justice O'Connor made in Flores. As to the other two cases cited by Justice
Blackmun in Vuitch, I agree with Rogers that they are distinguishable.
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that Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew in the Air Force, had no
constitutionally protected right to wear the yarmulke required by
his religion.' It therefore upheld an Air Force regulation barring
the wearing of headgear indoors, rejecting Goldman's request for
an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause. Goldman moved for
rehearing en banc, which was denied. Three judges dissented from
the denial of rehearing. Judge Kenneth Starr wrote a passionate
opinion declaring that the panel opinion upholding the Air Force
regulation "does considerable violence to the bulwark of freedom
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause."69 He cited Wisconsin v.
7 for the proposition that government must "accommodate
Yodeir
those who wish to exercise their religious liberties, unless the
accommodation would prove unduly burdensome.""' Judge
Starr's plea for the application of the pre-Smith rule to protect
Goldman's religious freedom was praised by none other than thenJudge Ginsburg. She, too, dissented from the denial of rehearing,
"[flor the reasons indicated in Judge Starr's eloquent statement."72 Her endorsement of Yoder might thus constitute some
evidence that she would not support Smith. It cannot be dispositive evidence, however, for one primary reason: The third dissenter from rehearing, who joined Judge Ginsburg's opinion, was thenJudge Scalia. And if we know anything, we know that Justice
Scalia thought Smith was rightly decided-and so dissenting in
Goldn cannot be definitively equated with disagreement with Smith.

68. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff/d

sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
69. Id. at 658 (Starr, J., dissenting).
70. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
71. Goldman, 739 F.2d at 659 (Starr, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. Judge Ginsburg also wrote opinions for the court of appeals in Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458
(1989), but neither case provides much evidence of her views on Smith. In Leahy,

Judge Ginsburg's opinion for a unanimous panel held that the District of Columbia
was required to show a compelling interest for its refusal to accept a passport and
birth certificate in lieu of a social security number for a driver's license applicant
with religious objections to providing his social security number. See Leahy, 833 F.2d

at 1048. According to the court of appeals, the district court misread Bowen v. Ray,
476 U.S. 693 (1986), as substituting a balancing test for the compelling interest
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There are undoubtedly other cases raising the baseline question and other Justices who have chosen to take as given rulings
with which they disagree. The cases discussed, however, should
be sufficient to suggest that Justice O'Connor truly faced a
choice between valid competing approaches.
III. SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE

Although the Court has never squarely faced the question of
whether its own decisions should be taken as a baseline by dissenting members, it has frequently reiterated the broader view
that its decisions are the binding law of the land. Usually it does
so in the course of chastising some rebellious state or federal
official--or some recalcitrant lower federal court-for ignoring
the Court's pronouncements. The language that the Court has
used in this context tends to confirm the unitary nature of the
Supreme Court, brushing off the views of individual Justices as
largely irrelevant.
The strongest example is a case decided two days before
Mores. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Agostini v.
Felton74 addressed the question of whether prior precedent had
been effectively overruled, justifying the grant of a Rule 60(b)(5)
motion for relief from an injunction. The earlier precedent,
Aguilar v. Felton,75 prohibited states-on Establishment Clause
grounds-from sending remedial teachers into parochial schools.
In the intervening time, five Justices in individual opinions
indicated a willingness to overrule Aguilar.76 The school board
therefore sought relief from the injunction prohibiting it from
sending remedial teachers into parochial schools, on the ground

analysis. See id. Judge Ginsburg's unexceptional citation of such cases as Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136 (1987), shows only that as a court of appeals judge she followed Supreme Court
precedent. In Olsen, the court of appeals held that the government need not exempt
the religious use of marijuana from criminal prosecution. Judge Ginsburg's opinion
followed both Supreme Court and lower court precedent to conclude that the exemption would unduly interfere with the government's interest in controlling the use of
marijuana generally. See Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1464.
74. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
75. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
76. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 750 (1994).
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that Aguilar had been effectively overruled.
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded in Agostini that
subsequent Establishment Clause cases had "so undermined
Aguilar that it [was] no longer good law."7" But Justice
O'Connor was careful to distinguish that ruling from the claim
that the statements of five individual Justices had overruled
Aguilar:

We also agree with respondents that the statements made
by five Justices in [Board of Education of] Kiryas Joel [v.

Grumet7l do not, in themselves, furnish a basis for concluding that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has changed.
In Kiryas Joel,... [flive Justices joined opinions calling for
reconsideration of Aguilar.... But the question of Aguilar's
propriety was not before us. The views of five Justices that the
case should be reconsidered or overruled cannot be said to
have effected a change in Establishment Clause law.79
Thus, the Court held, the district court in Agostini acted correctly in denying the Rule 60(b) motion." The district court, wrote
Justice O'Connor, held correctly "that the motion had to be denied unless and until this Court reinterpreted the binding

77. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2007.
78. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
79. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2007. It is instructive to compare Justice O'Connor's
approach to one taken by Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker fifty-five years earlier.
In Barnette v. West Virginia Board of Education, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942),
affd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Judge Parker, writing for a unanimous three-judge district court, refused to follow the Supreme Court's ruling in Minersuille School Dis.
trict v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). See Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 253. He reasoned
that a sufficient number of Justices had subsequently announced their disagreement
with Gobitis as to impair its authority. He thus enjoined school officials from requiring Jehovah's Witness children to salute the flag, despite the fact that the Court in
Gobitis had rejected an identical challenge to a flag-salute requirement. See id. at
255. The Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court's injunction without commenting on Judge Parker's nose counting. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 586 (1940). Those
were different times.
80. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018-19. The Supreme Court, in an unusual maneuver, reversed Aguilar and itself granted the motion dissolving the injunction. See
id.
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precedent."8 Even though five Justices found Aguilar unpersuasive, it remained the law of the land until it was overruled
by a majority opinion.
Justice O'Connor's careful distinction in Agostini also raises
more directly an interesting question about the baseline dilemma. Imagine that there had been four votes, not five, to overrule
Aguilar, and that the district court had nevertheless granted the
Rule 60(b) motion. What would Justice O'Connor-believing
Aguilar to be wrongly decided-have done? Her suggestion that
the district court acted properly even in the face of five votes to
overrule Aguilar strongly implies that in my counter-factual
world of only four votes she would have voted to reverse an
errant district court. She might have concurred separately, arguing in her opinion that Aguilar was ripe for overruling, but she
could hardly have reasoned that the Rule 60(b) motion should
have been granted. It was only the somewhat doubtful conclusion that the Court's own powers included the power to grant a
Rule 60(b) motion-in the same case in which it provided the
change in the law justifying such a grant-that allowed it to
reverse the district court. Had there not been five votes to
change the law, there would have been no justification for any
court, including the Supreme Court, to grant the motion. Comments in a dissenting opinion, as Justice Rehnquist noted almost two decades ago, "are just that: comments in a dissenting
opinion." "
Justice O'Connor also authored a dissenting opinion that
comes intriguingly close to the precise question I pose in this
Essay. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia," Justice
O'Connor dissented from the majority's holding that new Supreme Court rulings should always be applied retroactively.
Instead, she argued, the Court should decide the retroactivity
question case by case, depending on the equities. She reasoned
that when the Court announces a new rule, it is changing the
law, and it is not always fair to apply new law to old cases:
"[P]recisely because this Court has the power to say what the

81. Id. at 2017.
82. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10 (1980).
83. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
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law is, Marbury v. Madison, when the Court changes its mind,
the law changes with it."" Her language is tantalizingly suggestive. Did she mean to answer the question left open in
Marbury-who speaks for the judiciary?-by suggesting that the
law changes only when the Court changes its mind?
Similar, though somewhat less powerful, suggestions that only
official pronouncements of the Court as a whole can be taken as
the baseline can be found in other cases. In Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,s the Court warned lower
courts against concluding on their own that Supreme Court
precedent had been so undermined as to be of no value: "If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,
then the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly
controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative 6f overruling its
own decisions. " "
In Cooper v. Aaron,87 the first and broadest statement of the
Court's omnipotence, both the majority opinion and Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence seemed to view the Court as an indivisible unit. The majority opinion-signed by every Justice-announced that "the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the
supreme law of the land ...

."'

The opinion went on to suggest

that any official who disobeyed Brown was violating his oath to
support the Constitution. The Court thus implicitly equated its
own interpretation of the Constitution with the Constitution
itself. By so doing-admittedly the most controversial aspect of

84. Id. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotations marks
omitted). Justice O'Connor also quoted this statement in her dissent in Harper u.
Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 115 (1993).
85. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
86. Id. at 484 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in this case. She also repeated the quoted language in her own plurality opinion in American Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality opinion).
87. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
88. Id. at 18 (emphasis added) (discussing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1954)).

896

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

Cooper-the Court also necessarily implied that individual Justices, who themselves take an oath to support the Constitution,
are bound to respect decisions of the Court as equivalent to the
Constitution itself, until those decisions are overruled.
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was even more explicit in
denying the Justices any individuality. "The Constitution," he
wrote, "is not the formulation of the merely personal views of
the members of this Court. . .
9 The sentiment in Cooper
that Supreme Court decisions are the Constitution was reiterated recently by Justice Scalia. In his concurrence in American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,90 he declared: "To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid
it, but that the Constitution forbids it." 9
Finally, the discussion of stare decisis in PlannedParenthoodv.
Casey92 hints at allegiance to the view that the Court speaks as a
single unit, not as a plurality of individual voices. The plurality
opinion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
distinguished two earlier refusals to adhere to precedent: Brown
v. Board of Education," which failed to adhere to Plessy v.
95 which overFerguson," and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
96
ruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital and thus fatally undermined Lochner v. New York.97 According to the plurality opinion
in Casey, the decisions in Brown and West Coast Hotel were not
merely due to a change in membership. The decisions were "defensible, not merely as the victories of one doctrinal school over
another by dint of numbers (victories though they were), but as
applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not
been seen by the Court before."98 The members of the plurality-including Justice O'Connor who had previously urged the

89. Id. at 24-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
90. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).

91. Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

505
347
163
300
261

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

833
483
537
379
525

(1992).
(1954).
(1896).
(1937).
(1923).

97. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
98. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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overruling of Roe v. Wade' 9 -- voted to adhere to Roe as the law of
the land despite their personal views to the contrary.0 0
Thus, although the Court has never directly confronted the
baseline question, it has sometimes framed the Cooper question
in such a way as to suggest that even dissenting Supreme Court
Justices owe allegiance to majority opinions until and unless
they are overruled. Again, this demonstrates that the choice facing Justice O'Connor in Flores was a real one: she could legitimately, and with ample precedent, have chosen a course other
than the one she chose.
IV. BUT Is IT RIGHT?
The principal burden of this Essay has been to show that
various Justices of the Supreme Court have taken the view that
a dissenting Justice should nevertheless abide by the decision of
the majority in some cases. That a baseline approach may sometimes be appropriate, however, does not demonstrate that Justice O'Connor was necessarily wrong to choose another course in
Flores. All I have shown so far is that Justice O'Connor's approach is not so obviously correct as it first seems. Because I
have raised the issue, however, it would be remiss of me not to
offer at least a tentative suggestion of an appropriate resolution.
A colleague suggested an analogy that illustrates the problem
well. Imagine that a law faculty is trying to decide whether to
make a lateral appointment with tenure. The faculty must decide both whether to hire the candidate and whether to tenure
her. The candidate may very well accept an appointment without tenure, but she would prefer a tenured offer. After much
thought and discussion, you have reached two conclusions: (1)
your law school should not hire the candidate, because you already have enough faculty members in her field; and (2) she is
clearly deserving of tenure under your school's tenure standards.

99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

100. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
454 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that Roe's trimester framework is
"unworkable").
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In a bifurcated vote, you vote against hiring her-but you are
outvoted. How should you then vote on tenure? I think our intuitive reaction is to vote to grant tenure: a contrary vote would be
seen as mean-spirited or unprincipled. Notice, incidentally, that
it does not matter whether the hiring and tenure decisions are
part of a single "case" or take place several years apart; the
baseline question can arise within a single case or as a result of
a series of cases.
How might we apply the insight of the hiring-and-tenure
hypothetical to Supreme Court decision making? Let us start
with the jurisdictional cases, such as Vuitch. We might view the
jurisdictional cases as the most difficult example of the baseline
dilemma: Justices who find no jurisdiction are in a sense acting
ultra vires if they reach the merits. If this description is accurate, then the fact that some Justices have chosen the baseline
approach in this difficult context is strong evidence that it is
usually preferable in analogous but easier contexts. Indeed, even
if Justices Harlan and Blackmun were wrong in Vuitch, everyone will agree that sometimes the baseline approach is appropriate even in jurisdictional cases.
In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co.,' for example, the Court held that Congress could constitutionally confer diversity jurisdiction over cases between a
citizen of a state and a citizen of the District of Columbia. 2
(Never mind that this case raises other interesting questions.)
Justice Frankfurter dissented. Does his dissent in that case
mean that he should have refused to reach the merits in every
subsequent case before the Court in which the jurisdictional
basis was the statute challenged unsuccessfully in Tidewater?
Surely not. At some point, even if he continued to believe that
the statute was unconstitutional-and would vote to strike it
down and overrule Tidewater if he ever amassed enough support
among his brethren-he had to accept as the baseline that federal jurisdiction existed in these cases. Thus, the jurisdictional
cases offer strong support for the baseline approach.
But an argument might be made that these sorts of cases offer

101. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
102. See id. at 600.
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the least controversial application of the baseline approach. Despite the dissenting Justices' best efforts, the case is before them.
As in the hiring-and-tenure hypothetical, the initial opposition is
almost beside the point: fairness seems to require recognizing the
undisputed presence of the case-or of the new, but as yet
untenured, colleague. If this alternative description of the jurisdictional cases is the more accurate one, then perhaps both they
and the hiring-and-tenure hypothetical present a unique situation, which should not be extended by analogy to other cases.
Moreover, it is easy to imagine cases in which we would be
appalled if a Justice accepted the ruling of a majority and ultimately voted against his or her own preferred outcome. Justice
Kennedy in Fulminante cast the deciding vote to overturn
Fulminante's conviction, but what if the situation were exactly
reversed? Imagine that Justice Kennedy had concluded that the
confession was coerced and that the admission of coerced confessions should not be subject to the harmless error analysis. Had
he been outvoted on the harmless error question, and therefore
gone on to conclude that the admission did not constitute harmless error, then he would have sent a man to his death despite
his belief that the conviction was unconstitutional!
So let us examine another hypothetical, this one closer to
Flores itself. Imagine that Justice Scalia only mustered four
votes in Smith. The Court continued to hold, over his dissent,
that states must give religious exemptions absent a compelling
interest. Emboldened by the Court's steadfastness, Congress
enacts the Religious Freedom Restoration and Enforcement Act
(RFREA), which allows individuals who are unconstitutionally
denied exemptions to sue states for money damages. A state is
then sued for damages for its failure to provide an exemption.
The state claims immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, arguing that RFREA is unconstitutional because
Congress does not have the power to subject states to suit in
0 Confederal court. In fact, under Seminole Tribe v. Florida,"'
gress may abrogate state sovereign immunity-thus allowing
103. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

900

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

damage suits against states in federal court-if and only if it
does so as part of a legitimate exercise of its Section 5 power.
Assuming that Congress explicitly invoked its Section 5 power in
enacting RFREA, citing the counterfactual-Smith as precedent
for the free exercise rights it was enforcing, how should Justice
Scalia vote on the constitutionality of RFREA?
If your instincts are the same as mine, then you easily concluded that Justice Scalia should vote to uphold RFREA. If the
Supreme Court of the United States has determined that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments include a right to exemptions, then how can any individual Justice fault Congress for
enforcing that right? This might help us conclude that Justice
O'Connor, faced with the converse situation, similarly should
have accepted the will of the majority as the definitive statement of the law.
Of course, your instincts may differ from mine, or voting to
uphold RFREA and voting to strike down RFRA may be different. To hone in on how Justice O'Connor should have voted in
Fores, we need to discover the crucial differences among the
various cases and hypotheticals so far discussed. What distinguishes the counterfactual Fulminante hypothetical-in which
we would all condemn Justice Kennedy for voting against his
conscience-from Union Gas, the jurisdictional cases, the retroactivity cases, and the RFREA hypothetical? I suggest that all
of the latter raise separation-of-powers issues, while the hypothetical Fulminante raises questions of individual rights. And a
case about individual rights is not really a baseline case. Nor, as
I shall suggest in a moment, is a case that is primarily about
federalism.'

To see why, let us explore the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence
in greater detail. What exactly is the purpose served by limiting
Congress to enforcing judicially defined rights? Why can't Congress interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as it chooses and
104. The actual Fulminante case, of course, was also about individual rights. But
in voting against one's preferred outcome, there is a difference between casting a
vote that will, perhaps erroneously, protect individual rights, and casting a vote that
will, perhaps erroneously, deny protection. The difference is especially stark in cases
like Fulminante: It is the difference between setting free a man one thinks should
be executed and executing a man one thinks should be set free. See supra p. 894.

1998]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DILEMMA

enforce the rights it finds there?
One possibility is that Section 5 is primarily a protection of
federalism. We cannot let Congress run roughshod over the
states. Cabining Congress might be necessary to protect states
from intrusions on their sovereignty beyond those that are constitutionally permissible. Congress cannot redefine the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment because to do so would be to violate
the rights of states. If that is true, then perhaps Justice
O'Connor was correct to dissent in Fores. If the ultimate question is whether the states are being trampled upon unnecessarily, then her answer to that question is independent of the answer given by even a majority of her colleagues. Notice, however,
that this analysis also justifies Justice Scalia's hypothetical vote
to strike down RFREA. If RFREA goes beyond the Free Exercise
Clause, then it intrudes unnecessarily into state sovereignty.
Viewing Section 5 as a federalism provision, however, makes
all the difference. If Section 5 protects federalism, then the question of the constitutionality of RFRA, or RFREA, is not really
dependent on the Court's definition of free exercise rights, but
rather raises anew the same question as that raised in Smith:
To what extent are the prerogatives of states limited by constitutional considerations? Either state prerogatives are curtailed
when it comes to religious objections to neutral laws or they are
not. Under the federalism view of Section 5, asking whether the
Free Exercise Clause curtails state prerogatives by requiring
exemptions raises the same underlying question as asking
whether Congress is trampling on state prerogatives by requiring exemptions. The question really has to do with states, not
with Congress. Congress only happened to get in the picture by
arguably interfering with state prerogatives.
In answering the underlying question for the second time, it
may not matter to individual Justices what the Court has said
before, any more than it matters in repeat dissents. Repeat
dissents involve the persistence of the same disagreement, not
the determination of a new question dependent on the answer to
a previous question. One clue that differentiates repeat dissents
from baseline cases is that no Justice in a repeat dissent is like-
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ly to write as Justice O'Connor did in Flores-that "if I agreed
with the Court's standard in [Case A], I would join the opinion"
in Case B. °5 In a repeat dissent that statement would be silly:
"If I agreed with the majority the first time they decided this
question the wrong way, I would agree with them now that they
are making the same mistake again." A Justice in a repeat dissent case would be much more likely to declare that "I thought
the Court was wrong in Case A, and I still think so, and therefore I dissent in this case too."
The same analysis applies if Flores was really about individual liberty: the religious freedom of the church to renovate its
building despite the city's wish to preserve it as a landmark. In
that case, it really would not matter to any individual Justice
whether it is the First Amendment or RFRA that protects the
church's religious liberty. The crucial question would be whether
religious liberty was infringed by the city's refusal to issue a
building permit. Again, the issue is not really about Congress,
but about the prerogatives of the church. Similarly, in the hypothetical Fulminante case, the question before the Court is not so
much whether the state trial court erred but whether
Fulminante should be executed.
The foregoing analysis assumes that Section 5, as interpreted,
is designed to further federalism or individual rights. What if it
is instead a separation-of-powers provision? If Section 5 is primarily a separation-of-powers provision, then Flores is exactly
the paradigm baseline case. It asks whether Congress has exceeded the Court's instructions about the meaning of Section 5.
Under a separation-of-powers approach, the reason that Congress is limited to enforcing judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment is not primarily to keep Congress from intruding on states but to keep it from transgressing its own constitutional limits. The limits themselves may have federalism
implications, but it is separation-of-powers concerns that place
the ultimate and binding interpretation of those limits in the
hands of the Court rather than of Congress itself. Congress

105. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dis-

senting) ("Indeed, if I agreed with the Court's standard in Smith, I would join [Justice Kennedy's] opinion.").

1998]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DILEMMA

903

cannot redefine the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment because
that is the Court's job.
And therein lies the baseline dilemma: is it the Court'sjob or
the job of individual Justices? Here is where the cases discussed
in Parts II and III of this Essay are useful. These cases indicate
that in general, the Justices have viewed themselves as a unitary entity when it comes to separation of powers. Agostini in
particular illustrates the Court's adherence to a unitary vision of
the Court. On a separation-of-powers view, limiting Congress's
Section 5 power to enforcing judicially defined rights is necessary to keep Congress from "jumping the fence" and taking off
on its own.
That approach is analogous to the Supreme Court's view of
the effect of its own precedent on lower courts. Lower courts are
similarly precluded from jumping the fence and concluding on
their own that Supreme Court doctrines lack force. The limits on
Section 5 do the same thing horizontally that the requirement
that lower courts follow Supreme Court precedent does vertically. But if, as Justice O'Connor concluded in Agostini, the independent voices of five Justices do not give lower courts license to
jump the fence, then why should the independent voices of fewer
than five Justices give Congress such license?
Moreover, the most persuasive reasons for making the Court
the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution-depriving Congress of
the power to jump the fence-require giving it a unitary voice.
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer have recently argued
that the "settlement function" of law justifies the Supreme
Court's primacy as constitutional interpreter. 106 In order to
avoid chaos, they suggest, we must "giv[e] agents reasons to
obey laws with which they disagree."'0 7 They ultimately conclude that we cannot definitely provide such "content-independent" reasons for official obedience to the law unless we have a
single authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. Whether one
agrees in the end that Alexander's and Schauer's theory actually

106. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 10.
107. Id. at 1371.

904

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

supports the Supreme Court's most self-aggrandizing statements
in Cooper, they have offered the most powerful justification of
Cooper we have yet seen. If their argument fails, then Cooper
may well be unsupportable.
But to the extent that the settlement function of law requires
a single constitutional arbiter, that function is undermined if
individual Justices do not accept prior decisions as authoritative
statements of law. It is one thing for the Court to change its
collective mind, although if it does so often enough, we might
lose much of the value of having a single final arbiter. It is quite
another, however, for individual Justices to take the position
that a prior decision of the Court need not bind other governmental actors simply because it was incorrect. A Justice who
takes such a position is in effect denying that she or any other
governmental actor has any content-independent reason for
obeying the dictates of the Supreme Court.
I am, at least tentatively, persuaded that Flores raised primarily separation-of-powers issues, and that Alexander and
Schauer are correct to defend Cooper. I therefore conclude that
Justice O'Connor should have taken the baseline approach and
accepted Smith as positive law even if it was incorrectly decided.
The real question for our purposes, however, is what Justice
O'Connor thinks. Here there is little room for doubt. Even the
most cursory glance at Section III-A of Justice Kennedy's opinion, which she explicitly approves, makes it clear that the primary defect of RFRA is that it violates Congress's duty to stay
within the limits prescribed by the Court, not that it trespasses
on state prerogatives. Nor does Justice O'Connor think that
Flores was primarily an individual rights case. Had she viewed
the question as whether the church's rights were being violated,
she would not have needed to address the constitutionality of
RFRA. She could instead have applied pre-Smith doctrine to
reach a conclusion about the ultimate merits of the case. RFRA
would have been irrelevant. But Justice O'Connor never tells us
her views on the religious liberty issue. We do not know whether, even under her preferred interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, the church is legally entitled to its building permit. The
issue that concerns Justice O'Connor, then, is the same one that
concerns the majority, and it is a question of separation of pow-
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ers: whether Congress transgressed Court-imposed limits when
it enacted RFRA. Her only dispute with the majority is about
the content of those Court-imposed limits." 8
Justice O'Connor's allegiance to Cooper is shown not only by
the same portion of Kennedy's opinion, which one commentator
has described as a reaffirmation of the rule of obedience announced in Cooper, °9 but also by her concurrence in the repeated statements of the Court canvassed in Part III of this
Essay. Justice O'Connor apparently views the limits on
Congress's Section 5 power as but one instantiation of the basic
separation-of-powers rule that the Court, and not Congress, has
the final say on the meaning of the Constitution. Taking that
view, however, ought to trigger at least a presumption that
when the Court has spoken, its word remains law until five
Justices say otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION

In Flores, Justice O'Connor chose to base congressional power
to enforce the Constitution on her own dissenting constitutional
interpretation, rather than on the interpretation of the Supreme
Court. She thus implicitly rejected a view that she and other
Justices have often endorsed, at least in separation-of-powers
cases: That the Supreme Court as a whole, and not merely the
collected votes of individual Justices, determines what the law is
at any given time. On this view, even dissenting Justices must
take majority decisions as a baseline for measuring later actions,
until five Justices agree to overrule those decisions.
Instead of measuring congressional power against the view of
the Free Exercise Clause that she wished had prevailed, Justice
O'Connor might have chosen to accept that Smith marked the

108. Another way to put this is to suggest that Justice O'Connor, by voting on

the constitutionality of RFRA rather than on the church's entitlement to a building
permit, chose to vote by issue rather than by outcome. Having done that, however,
she then chose to ignore the majority's decision on one of the issues.
109. See Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott. A Response to Alexander and
Schauer, 15 CONST. CommNTARY (forthcoming 1998).
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boundaries of congressional power, despite her substantive disagreement with that decision. The appeal of Justice O'Connor's
unselfconscious refusal to accept the interpretation of the majority may be apparent. After all, it was the Constitution she
was expounding. A closer examination, however, reveals that the
appeal was only apparent. The purpose of this Essay has been to
suggest that, at least if Flores is viewed primarily as a separation-of-powers case, then Justice O'Connor should indeed have
voted to invalidate RFRA, or at least have explained why she
did not do so. In fact, Justice O'Connor did not address the baseline question at all. The question is a difficult one, and although
I have offered my own answer, I am open to persuasion. Even
so, I am certain that the question is substantial enough to warrant more consideration than Justice O'Connor provided.

